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Security Committee

SECOM-D-691

20 NOV 1979

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Chairman

SUBJECT: Security Committee Proposal for  
Community Security Budget Items (U)

1. Action Requested: That you forward the attached enumeration of costs of Community security programs to the Deputy for Resource Management and the Comptroller CIA for use in considering ways and means to fund security enhancements which the Intelligence Community sorely needs. (U)

2. Background: In restructuring the Security Committee just over a year ago, the DCI endorsed the concept that this Committee serve as his focal point for all security matters in the Community. He further endorsed the idea of bold strokes to weld this previously collegial body into a unified force to upgrade and improve security. In a move in that direction, the Committee has identified significant issues of a Community security nature which have gone largely unfunded for one reason or another, but primarily because they transcend the province of any individual agency. (C)

Among these issues, we recognized pervasive shortfalls in providing adequate technical countermeasures searches in industry, particularly in those complexes building some of

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ORIGINAL CL BY 063344  
 DECL & REVW ON Oct 1999  
 EXT BY ND 5 YRS BY 063344  
 REASON HHB 70-2 9(c)3


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our most sensitive future technical collectors. We identified the need to upgrade the Community's countermeasures training facility and outfit it with equipment to meet today's threats. We projected the supplemental staffing necessary to do technical sweeps on a minimal basis in government and industry. We believe that there will be a need to fund a computerized central registry to serve the Community under adoption of any APEX Program of Special Access Approvals. We find a large security weakness in the use of [redacted]

[redacted] and believe that we must initiate steps now toward replacing [redacted] them with Americans when the new US Embassy there is complete. We see the need for R&D and new equipment costs to bring security to optimum level at that Embassy. Finally, we see the need for R&D to modernize technical and physical security equipment and procedures for standard usage throughout the Community. (S)

These programs are beyond the scope and purview of any single agency yet they should be recognized and pursued as legitimate and valid factors in consideration of the Community's security needs. We have not hitherto succeeded in identifying funding for these issues. Several attempts to secure resources on a piece meal basis from Community members met with no success. As Departmental budgets become tighter, opportunities to commit resources for security become more difficult. We were pleased when recent events gave a slight hope for supplemental budget relief. We compiled the attached listing of programs, projects and costs, and were ready to submit them to the DCI, when definitive word was received that there would be no supplementals to the budget. (U)

3. Staff Position: We believe strongly that security programs such as we have listed merit serious consideration and favorable action, and that some way should be found to provide for them. Toward this end, the Security Committee supports the DCI's idea of having funds identified in the overall Intelligence Budget for his use in satisfying broad Community-wide issues and programs, but we are reluctant to have them incorporated in an open Intelligence Community budget. As an alternative they could be incorporated in the



CIA Budget as executive agent. This would close out opportunity for inclusion in the finalized FY 81 CIA Budget and push back opportunity for hearings until preparation of the 1982 Budget. In the interest of bringing these matters to attention at this time we offer the attached listing of security programs as representative candidates for inclusion in an appropriate budget framework. The Security Committee believes these needs should be identified to the Deputy for Resource Management and the Comptroller CIA for their consideration and suggestions. (C)

4. Recommendation: It is recommended that you forward a copy of this memorandum and its attachments to the Deputy for Resource Management and to the CIA Comptroller for their attention. (U)



Robert W. Gambino

Attachments

CONCURRENCE:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Don I. Wortman  
Deputy Director for Administration

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

APPROVED:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

RECORDED

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### The Central Access Registry

1. The CIA presently provides service of common concern to the Intelligence Community in the form of a capability for limited central access registration of personnel approved for access to Special Compartmented Intelligence (SCI).

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1. In 1977 an updated concept called the 4C System was devised in Community deliberations. It was determined that the 4C System could provide rapid on-line verification of access approvals and serve as an effective access control or accounting mechanism. The 4C System could be implemented within the Intelligence Community within a year at a cost of [redacted]. World wide implementation would take from 18 to 30 months from date of approval at a cost of slightly in excess of [redacted]. These total costs now (1979) would be in excess of [redacted]

3. The 4C System would improve efficiency through uniform handling of data bases with common requirements and achieve cost advantages not attainable by individual agencies within the Intelligence Community. The continuous real-time data availability and elimination of the need to contact multiple sources for access verification along with a historical data base would be important advances in ensuring the security of SCI programs.

4. The 4C System is considered to be an integral element for adoption in the presently proposed APEX Special Access Control System.

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Mr. Perrine. Probably not unless it came from other sources, another investigative service who may have forwarded it to our agency, but as an active investigation on the part of the FBI, as Mr. Nugent indicated, no.

This is not to say that if violent, illegal acts do occur, or are imminent, that the FBI could not investigate. Rather, before such acts occur, groups cannot be investigated for mere advocacy of violence.

The Subcommittee recognizes that the inconsistency between E.O. 10450 and the Domestic Security Investigation Guidelines is bound to produce similar examples. The Subcommittee is divided as to whether it is the Executive Order or the Guidelines which should be reassessed, but all members of the Subcommittee agree that the inconsistencies of these two policy documents should be resolved so as to provide a clearer understanding of what information should be collected and made available for security clearance investigations. This reassessment should also examine the provisions of the Privacy Act and take into account the applicable Supreme Court decisions. The upcoming consideration of the recently proposed FBI charter will offer an appropriate opportunity to resolve these issues.

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